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6. Journalists’ confidential 
sources: Reform lessons from 
recent Australian shield law cases
That journalism, especially journalism delving into serious impropriety, 
relies heavily upon a journalist’s ability to honour promises of confiden-
tiality to sources, and therefore needs protection, has been well acknow- 
ledged. Former Attorney-General Philip Ruddock in proposing protec-
tion for journalists’ confidential sources—commonly referred to as shield 
law—in the first such major federal level initiative, said ‘[t]his privilege is 
an important reform to evidence law’ (Explanatory Memorandum, 2007, 
p. 7); and in the circumstances then prevailing ‘the protection of journalists 
is too important an issue to wait’ (Philip Ruddock, Second Reading Speech, 
2007). In one instance the court went so far as to say that the importance 
of source protection was ‘entirely unexceptionable and in accordance with 
human experience and common sense’ (Liu, 2010, para 51). Are journalists’ 
confidential sources better protected with the advent of statutory protection 
in several Australian jurisdictions? The media does not think so (MEAA, 
2013). Former Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus observed towards the 
end of his term of office: ‘Recent court proceedings have highlighted the 
inadequacy of protections for journalists in some jurisdictions and lack of 
uniformity in laws across Australia’ (Dreyfus, 2013). The current Com-
monwealth government policy in relation to national uniform shield law is 
unclear. The Australian shield law framework beckons reform and recent 
events indicate some potential reform areas.
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AUSTRALIAN journalists’ initial optimism at the introduction of statutory shield protection has been afflicted by doubt following a number of court actions to discover journalists’ confidential sources. 
The journalism profession’s peak body, the Media, Entertainment and Arts 
Alliance (MEAA) noted that it was ‘unprecedented in Australia that so many 
journalists are simultaneously in this position’ (Press Freedom Report, 2013, 
p. 16). Counsel in one of the cases noted ‘a significant increase in the number 
of applications for disclosures of sources against the media’ (Ralston, 2013). 
Protection for journalists’ confidential sources has attracted law reform at-
tention for about two decades (Twomey, 1992; Senate Standing Committee, 
1994). The initial hurdle—whether source protection should be enshrined 
in statute—was overcome at Commonwealth level in 2007 with the passage 
of a federal shield law (Evidence Act 1995, Part 3.10, Division 1A). That 
underwent further reform in 2011 and the MEAA said it presented ‘some 
cause for optimism’ (Warren, 2011, p. 3). The signs for the media have been 
described as good although the battle is not yet won (ABC TV, Media Watch, 
2013). The MEAA is pushing ‘for uniform national shield laws that fully 
acknowledge and properly protect journalist privilege’ (Warren, 2013, p. 4). 
Australia’s multi-jurisdictional law-making framework has produced a mix 
of legislative measures ostensibly aimed at offering greater source protec-
tion. Where shield law has been introduced, the lawmakers claim that their 
provisions strike the right balance (Robert McClelland, 2010, p. 1239; Chris-
tian Porter, 2011, p. 16). The occasional judicial scepticism towards shield 
law, however, undermines the media’s confidence in present shield law. The 
then Attorney-General stated at the outset: ‘The new privilege will not be 
absolute’ (Philip Ruddock, Second Reading Speech, 2007, p. 6). The media, 
however, is not seeking absolute protection. As one newspaper at the heart of 
a major shield law case wrote in an editorial: 
The media is not seeking a system of open slather: The West Austral-
ian believes that the entitlement of a journalist to retain confidentiality 
should be open to challenge and should not apply where a journalist 
has no reasonable basis for believing the information provided to them 
was true, or if it was not a matter of public interest. (The West Austral-
ian, 2011, p. 20)
Given such unequivocal support for qualified protection how can effective 
shield law be achieved? This article sets out the Australian shield law back-
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drop; provides an overview of the prevailing protections; considers major 
recent shield law cases and some of the lessons they offer to journalists; and 
suggests potential reforms. This article is based on a legal analysis of recent 
Australian shield law cases. The way forward is not as simple as reflected 
in the suggestion that ‘[a]ll that remains is for states and territories to pass 
complementary legislation’ (O’Shea, 2011). 
Overview of the law
Two key aspects of the shield law discourse bear noting at the start. One is 
the legal framework and the other is the manner in which the legal frame-
work has impacted on specific court cases. Recent cases highlight how jour-
nalists’ efforts to protect their confidential sources become entangled in le-
gal processes and intricacies, how competing legitimate interests demand 
consideration and how the courts respond to these competing demands. The 
legal framework is considered first. 
Statutory shield
Following the passage of federal shield law in 2007, New South Wales be-
came the first jurisdiction to adopt a statutory shield (Evidence Act 1995, Part 
3.10, Division 1C). Since then statutory shield protection has become avail-
able in all jurisdictions except Queensland, Northern Territory and South 
Australia (Fernandez, 2013a, pp. 20-22). Statutory protection is available at 
Commonwealth level, Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales, Victo-
ria, Western Australia and Tasmania (respective Evidence Acts, ss. 126H(1), 
126K(1), 126K(1), 126K(1), 20I and 126B(1)). The prosecution of Herald 
Sun journalists, Michael Harvey and Gerard McManus, over an article they 
wrote in February 2004 about the Commonwealth government’s planned 
cutbacks to war veterans’ entitlements, based on confidential documents, can 
be credited for long-overdue attention to the need for statutory protection 
for journalists’ confidential sources (Bills Digest, 2009, p. 4). In that case 
the court refused to recognise the journalists’ claim for protection, and fined 
the journalists A$7000, noting that the ‘law does not currently recognise any 
“journalists’ privilege”’ (McManus, 2006, para 90). This led to the first major 
initiative in the past decade, to introduce protection for journalists’ sources 
and this was done through the Commonwealth Evidence Amendment (Jour-
nalists’ Privilege) Act 2007. That initiative also had the support of the current 
Attorney-General, Senator George Brandis QC (Bills Digest, 2007, p. 2). 
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That the statutory protections were only more recently introduced, however, 
does not mean that journalists refusing to disclose confidential sources be-
fore a court were totally unprotected. 
Common law
The courts have long had discretion under the common law to excuse jour-
nalists from revealing their sources. In practice, however, the courts have 
generally not been sympathetic to journalists’ claims for source protection. 
Several journalists have been convicted of contempt of court for refusing 
to disclose their confidential sources (Fernandez, 2013b, p. 139). The com-
mon law clearly does not recognise any privilege for journalists’ confidential 
sources (McGuinness, p. 102-103; McManus, 2007, para 55; Pennells, para 
76). In the McGuinness case the court cited the ‘inflexible rule’ denying rec-
ognition of protection for sources except in extremely limited circumstances 
(pp. 102-103). In the Cojuangco case, however, the court acknowledged the 
need for ‘some restraints’ on a litigant’s entitlement to compel disclosure (p. 
354). In that case, the High Court recognised that the free flow of informa-
tion is vital in investigative journalism ‘which is such an important feature 
of our society’ but noted that the courts could not go so far as to ‘leave the 
individual without an effective remedy’, for example, in respect of defama-
tory imputations published in the media (ibid). On such an approach, disclo-
sure would generally not be compelled ‘unless it is necessary to do justice 
between the parties’ (Cojuangco, p. 355). In that case the court also said the 
‘paramount’ public interest was the administration of justice (Cojuangco, p. 
354). The legislature, however, could tilt the equilibrium in favour of jour-
nalists by enshrining the protection through statute. The Chief Judge in the 
McManus case said as much when he observed that judges are required by 
the law to administer the law ‘and if that law is to be changed, as the journal-
ists would have it, then their plea must be taken to the legislature’ (McManus, 
2007, para 62). 
Shield law cases
The MEAA described the recent shield law cases as the ‘relentless pursuit 
of journalists in expensive legal actions’ (Press Freedom Report, 2013, 
p. 16) while a lawyer who acted in such cases noted ‘an increasing num-
ber of applications for journalists to discover their sources’ (Bartlett, 2013, 
p. 6). These cases involved Nick McKenzie, Richard Baker and Philip 
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Dorling of The Age; Steve Pennells of The West Australian newspaper; Steve 
Lewis of News Limited; Adele Ferguson of The Age; and Paddy Manning of 
The Sydney Morning Herald (Press Freedom Report, 2013, p. 16). Lewis’ 
case ended with the Federal Court deciding that he did not have to hand over 
a document; Manning’s case was settled; and the Western Australia Supreme 
Court set aside Ferguson’s subpoena on 7 October 2013. Each of these cases 
was set against unique circumstances and the pressures for disclosure in the 
respective cases were varied. This article focuses on three of the cases, which 
comprise more than one proceeding in some instances—the Bank Notes case; 
the Helen Liu case; and the Pennells case—as they provide some discussion 
on issues that arise in a shield law context. While it would be desirable to 
find an overarching principle to provide journalists a clear justification for an 
effective shield law, these cases present a fresh reminder of the challenges 
in trying to satisfy all sides and of the difficulty in finding a simple unifying 
principle that goes beyond a presumption that journalists are not required by 
law to reveal their confidential sources. 
The Bank Notes Case
This case involved a quest for disclosure of the sources of two investigative 
journalists’, Nick McKenzie and Richard Baker from The Age newspaper, as 
part of a committal hearing involving not them but former Reserve Bank of 
Australia bank note executives charged with bribery. A committal hearing is 
essentially aimed at determining whether there is enough evidence to order a 
person charged with an offence to stand trial or be sentenced. In this case the 
relevant provision was s. 97 of Victoria’s Criminal Procedure Act 2009. The 
legal instrument used to notify the journalists of the demand was a witness 
summons, which required them to give evidence and produce certain docu-
ments at the committal hearing in relation to their article published in 2012 
entitled ‘Bagman to tell all in notes scandal’ (McKenzie, 2013b, para 7). That 
article attributed information to a ‘senior government source’ and said the 
bagman had agreed to turn star witness and testify that several former RBA 
bank note executives used him to pay millions of dollars in bribes to officials 
in Jakarta in return for contracts (McKenzie & Baker, 2012). 
Counsel for one of the accused sought to question the journalists about 
a source that revealed a major development in the bribery prosecution (Press 
Freedom Report, 2013, p. 17). The purpose of this questioning was for a 
legitimate forensic purpose—that there was a connection between the attempt 
 122  PACIFIC JOURNALISM REVIEW 20(1) 2014
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM TRENDS
to discover the journalists’ sources and the issues raised in the proceedings 
involving the bank executive concerned. The purpose, according to the bank 
executive’s lawyer, was to ask whether the journalists’ information was 
accurate, who provided that information, and if it was somebody who had 
that information when the prosecution did not have that information ‘then we 
can make appropriate inquiries and if necessary, we can obtain that material’ 
(McKenzie, 2013b, para 17). These are arguably legitimate questions in the 
course of a fair trial.
Magistrate Phillip Goldberg ruled that there was a legitimate forensic 
purpose behind the issue of the summons to each of the journalists (McKenzie, 
2013b, para 18). The journalists’ counsel argued common law principles sup-
porting protection of journalists’ confidential sources as the then newly-passed 
Victorian shield law did not apply to the case (ibid). Magistrate Goldberg 
also noted: ‘There is no law which protects, that is coded or statute law that 
protects or creates a rule that recognises journalist privilege’ (Akerman, 2012). 
He was speaking in Victoria’s context where the State’s shield law, although 
it was passed, did not take effect until 1 January 2013 and even if it applied 
it would have been a different question whether it would have helped the 
journalists. The Age journalists then filed an action in the Victorian Supreme 
Court to quash the magistrate’s decision. None of the three grounds relied on 
in this action, however, directly involved a claim for protection of confidential 
sources (McKenzie, 2013b, para 23). Among the appeal grounds were that the 
magistrate denied them natural justice. 
The Victorian Supreme Court dismissed the journalists’ application for 
judicial review on all three grounds. Justice Michael Sifris said the court was 
not concerned with the correctness of the magistrate’s decision but rather 
whether the magistrate acted properly, within jurisdiction and complied with 
the law (McKenzie, 2013a, para 16; McKenzie, 2013b, paras 24-27). While it 
may seem curious that a court of review states plainly that it is not concerned 
with the correctness of a lower court’s decision, the fact was that the journal-
ists sought judicial review under court rules that were ‘essentially concerned 
with procedure’ (McKenzie, 2013a, para 16, emphasis added). In other words, 
the concern was not with the lower court’s decision per se on the merits of 
any claim for source protection but with the court’s decision-making process. 
The journalists then appealed to the Victorian Court of Appeal against 
Justice Sifris’ orders. This action too reveals an oddity because the appeal was 
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based on ‘very different’ grounds from the ones before Justice Sifris and it 
was still unrelated to shield law (McKenzie, 2013b, para 28). These grounds 
included one that the judge had erred in failing to set aside the witness sum-
monses to the journalists on the basis that they were beyond the power of that 
court. Although journalists generally appeared to view this case as a source 
protection battle, the judicial process in this case did not explicitly involve a 
claim for source protection. As Justice Sifris observed, it was irrelevant that 
the court’s decision-making process, if that process were correctly approached, 
would result in the journalists having to reveal their sources. 
This case is not about the protection of sources by journalists. It is an 
assessment as to whether correct procedures were followed and the law 
was complied with and not the substantive correctness of the Ruling. 
(McKenzie, 2013a, para 20)
Fortunately for the journalists, the Victorian Court of Appeal unanimously 
allowed the appeal, once again on a ground not argued before (McKenzie, 
2013b, para 59). The grounds for overturning the lower court’s decision did 
not turn on any argument for source protection, although the court acknow- 
ledged the importance of source protection (McKenzie, 2013b, para 3). To 
be sure, the court’s remarks on this point were counter-balanced by the view 
that worthy as a journalist’s ethical obligation on confidentiality is, it ‘some-
times comes into conflict with other, equally worthy, principles—or even its 
own rationale’ (McKenzie, 2013b, para 4). 
The Court of Appeal was blunt in its summation of the bank executive’s 
pursuit of the journalists’ sources stating that he ‘is in reality embarked upon 
a fishing expedition in the hope that something might turn up as a result of 
the applicants’ appearance in the witness box’ (McKenzie, 2013b, para 54). 
The court was mildly critical of magistrate Goldberg’s failure to indicate how 
knowledge of source identity would assist in resolving the issue of legitimate 
forensic purpose and it observed that ‘presumably he accepted’ the opposite 
side’s submission on that point (McKenzie, 2013b, para 4). The actual court 
proceedings in this case did not consider the merits of source protection. Also, 
the final outcome, favourable as it was to the journalists, was ultimately decided 
on a ground not argued before or decided upon by the trial judge (McKenzie, 
2013b, para 54). In reaching the view that the journalists’ contentions upon 
appeal should be allowed in the Bank Notes case, the Court of Appeal said no 
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court may exceed its jurisdiction or power and that the magistrate had adopted 
an impermissibly broad view of his power (McKenzie, 2013b, para 36). In 
approaching law reform, this case suggests a need to more explicitly address 
‘fishing expeditions’. The Western Australia shield law, which requires reasons 
to be given for giving or refusing to give a direction (Evidence Act, s 20J (4), 
provides a cue. In such situations, the courts must explain their reasons so as to 
guide future conduct by journalists or assist with the preparation of a challenge 
of a decision ordering disclosure. The WA statute requires a consideration of 
the ‘probative value of the identifying evidence’ and the ‘importance of the 
identifying evidence’ (ss. 20J (3) (a) and (b)). Such a provision could also 
reinforce the discouragement of ‘fishing expeditions’ by requiring applicants 
for disclosure to have a reasonable belief of their right to seek relief in court, 
such as is found in Federal Court Rule 7.23 (United Voice case, paras 7 and 
84-86). 
The Helen Liu case
This case involved a series of articles, relying on confidential sources, that 
claimed a link between the former defence minister Joel Fitzgibbon and 
entrepreneur Helen Liu. In McKenzie’s and Baker’s words: ‘Fitzgibbon 
and the Labor Party received substantial political donations from Liu and 
he failed to declare to the Australian Parliament that she twice paid for him 
to travel to China’ (Press Freedom Report, 2013, p. 17). Fitzgibbon denied 
receiving a $150,000 payment from Liu as part of ‘a campaign to cultivate 
him as an agent of political and business influence’ and he sued The Age 
for defamation (Ralston, 2013). Liu filed a defamation action against three 
unknown defendants claiming that these sources were liable for damage 
to her character, credit and reputation as a result of the re-publication. She 
launched legal action to compel The Age and its journalists, Richard Baker, 
Philip Dorling and Nick McKenzie (‘the journalists’), to disclose the identi-
ties of the sources that provided them with the information and documents 
leading to the publication of the defamatory imputations. She sought orders 
under Rule 5.2(2)(a) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (‘Rule 5’) for pre-
liminary discovery from The Age and the journalists (Liu, 2013, paras 1-3). 
The New South Wales Supreme Court and the New South Wales Court 
of Appeal found in Liu’s favour. The Age sought special leave to appeal to 
the High Court. The High Court refused leave (Liu, HCA). The source dis-
closure cases involving Liu and The Age total five (Liu, 2010; Liu, 2011; Liu, 
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2012; Liu, 2013; and Liu, HCA). The New South Wales Court of Appeal was 
critical of the protracted hearings as they were used by the defendants to em-
bark on an examination of the merits of Liu’s claim. The court noted that this 
was ‘not an appropriate course’ in relation to an interlocutory matter where 
the overriding purpose was to facilitate the ‘just, quick and cheap resolution 
of the real issues in the proceedings’ and in such a circumstance it was ‘quite 
inappropriate for contested issues of fact’ to be litigated (Liu, 2013, para 103; 
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s. 56).
The first hearing involved Liu’s attempt to identify those who may be liable 
to her for claims that she corruptly paid Fitzgibbon $150,000 (Liu, 2010, para 
1). That information, according to The Age, was quoted from documents said 
to be Liu’s personal and business records (Liu, 2013, para 5). Liu, however, 
contended that at least two of the documents ‘were forged or falsified’ by an 
unknown person (Liu, 2010, para 2). The forgery allegation was ‘critical’ 
to Liu’s application for discovery (Liu, 2010, para 12). The purpose of her 
Rule 5 action was to identify persons other than the journalists who may be 
separately liable to her although this did not absolve the journalists of any 
defamation claim (Liu, 2010, paras 34-35). While the court’s power to order 
disclosure under Rule 5 is discretionary and the court may consider the public 
interest in source protection, the weight given to protection ‘would plainly be 
substantially undermined in the case of a source that had used a journalist as 
an unwitting agent of fraud’ (Liu, 2010, para 12). 
The third hearing involved a closer consideration of Liu’s quest for orders 
to the journalists to reveal their sources; how the documents were obtained; 
and an order to the journalists to provide all memoranda, notes, notebooks, 
audio recordings, video recordings, diaries, draft articles, correspondence, 
records of interview and other documents and papers or copies which relate 
to or record any interview, meetings, conversation or other actions with the 
source which may identify the source (Liu, 2012, para 5). The court ruled in 
Liu’s favour. The journalists contended that the remedy Liu sought conflicted 
with the implied constitutional freedom of communication on matters of 
government and politics recognised by the High Court in the Lange v ABC case 
(Liu, 2012, para 8). This implied freedom was developed by the High Court in 
a series of cases and it has been observed that, overall, it is beyond question 
that media organisations have been the principal immediate beneficiaries of 
this freedom (Chesterman, p. 311). 
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The journalists argued that in light of Lange, it should now be held that 
the Newspaper Rule is ‘absolute’ as it prevents the disclosure of a journalist’s 
confidential source that is used in discussing matters of government or politics 
(Liu, 2012, para 12). This was clearly an ambitious exercise and Justice Lucy 
McCallum rejected that argument (Liu, 2012, paras 14 and 44). The judge 
reminded that the Newspaper Rule is only a judicial practice of refusing to 
compel discovery and that ‘it has always been the case that disclosure of a 
source will be compelled when it is necessary in the interests of justice’ (Liu, 
2012, para 42). The court held that giving the Newspaper Rule absolute effect 
in cases involving political discussion would, in essence, automatically protect 
sources regardless of the reasonableness or honesty of the conduct concerned. 
While agreeing that Rule 5 could effectively burden the implied freedom of 
communication, the court said the rule concerned was ‘reasonably appropri-
ate and adapted’ to serve a legitimate end—to allow for the identification of a 
person for the purpose of seeking a remedy allowed under a constitutionally 
prescribed system of representative and responsible government (Liu, 2012, 
para 61). The court said the protection of sources ‘is not a right or an end in 
itself’ (Liu, 2012, para 203).
The court also found that Liu was not motivated by an improper purpose 
and intention (Liu, 2012, paras 106 and 108). Furthermore, the defendants did 
not dispute that Liu had a valid claim in defamation against the sources (Liu, 
2012, para 118). Notwithstanding the decision going against the journalists, the 
court said the case sat ‘uncomfortably on the fault-line of strong, competing 
public interests’ and this was complicated by the positions of the plaintiff and 
the defendants resting on conflicting factual contentions (Liu, 2012, para 168). 
On the one hand the journalists’ were claiming that following lengthy and 
careful negotiation they obtained documents showing the making of corrupt 
payments by the plaintiff to a Federal MP, and that the sources genuinely feared 
reprisal if their identities were revealed (Liu, 2012, para 169). On the other 
hand, the plaintiff argued that someone with a vendetta against her provided 
deliberately forged documents that they falsely attributed to her and that to 
deny her relief would perpetuate the fraud (Liu, 2012, para 170). The journal-
ists then appealed to the New South Wales Supreme Court but lost the appeal 
in a unanimous decision (Liu, 2013). The fifth part of the hearing involved a 
request for special leave to the High Court, to seek constitutional recognition 
for the Newspaper Rule. The High Court rejected the application for leave. 
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Some factors appeared to undermine the claim for source confidentiality 
in this case, a significant one being the question of whether documents relied 
on in the articles were forged. The journalists’ position was that ‘the sources 
were credible and could be trusted to provide accurate and truthful informa-
tion concerning the plaintiff’ (Liu, 2010, para 21). While no determination 
was made on the point, as the court was not required to at this stage, the court 
said that the handwritten documents relied on by the defendants ‘may well 
have been falsely attributed’ to Liu (Liu, 2012, para 188). 
A further factor that undermined the journalists’ claim to confidentiality 
appears to be that one of the defendants (Baker) disobeyed a specific request 
from the sources not to publish certain handwritten papers that had been 
‘included inadvertently’ among the documents provided (Liu, 2012, paras 
200-201). Contrary to that request, however, The Age published details of the 
handwritten papers on its front page. In the end this case did not determine 
the merits of the journalists’ claim for source protection. It was an interlocu-
tory matter and the journalists’ failed in their attempt to have the merits of 
source protection considered. As such, this case offers limited lessons in the 
context of the present discussion. One clear lesson from this case, however, 
is journalists must be extremely cautious about the materials that they rely 
upon for stories, especially those with the potential to cause serious harm. 
The Pennells case
While it is referred to here as the Pennells case, journalist Steve Pennells and 
his publisher WAN Ltd were only Third Parties in a dispute that was between 
mining magnate Gina Rinehart and members of her family. Other related 
hearings are not important for present purposes. Of present significance is 
the fact that Pennells and his newspaper publisher had been subpoenaed to 
produce documents to the arbitrator who was presiding over a commercial 
arbitration (Pennells, paras 1-4). On one side was Hancock Prospecting Pty 
Ltd (Rinehart) and on the other side were ten Respondents, among them the 
Rinehart children, John, Bianca and Hope. Rinehart and the Respondents 
were parties to arbitration under Western Australia’s Commercial Arbitra-
tion Act 1985 (‘CA Act’). It was in the course of that arbitration that the 
Court issued subpoenas to Pennells (HPPL later abandoned its direct pur-
suit of Pennells) and his publisher WA Newspapers Ltd (WAN), on HPPL’s 
application, under s 17(1) of the CA Act. That section allows any par-
ty to an arbitration agreement to issue a subpoena to produce documents 
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specified in the subpoena (Pennells, para 15). Section 17(2) of that Act, how-
ever, protects against disclosure, where that disclosure cannot be compelled 
on the trial of an action (Pennells, paras 16 and 114). Taken with Western 
Australia’s shield law, this factor was significant in the final outcome in 
Rinehart’s source pursuit.
The subpoena to WAN sought the production of copies of recordings or 
notes of conversations between Pennells or any other WA journalist relating to 
subjects of a number of articles in The West ‘in which he referred to a dispute 
between Gina Rinehart and some of her children’ and ‘more generally to the 
affairs of the members of the Rinehart family, and to the business of HPPL and 
related companies’ (Pennells, paras 12 and 14). WAN sought to set the subpoena 
aside citing three grounds, including that the subpoena served ‘no legitimate 
forensic purpose’ because the documents were not relevant to the arbitration 
(Pennells, para 5); and that the subpoena was ‘oppressive or constitutes an 
abuse of process’ (Pennells, paras 6 and 44). Initially, WAN’s factors to set 
aside did not include Shield Laws because of a ‘timing’ issue—the law only 
came into operation later, on 21 November 2012. Once it came into force WAN 
relied on the WA shield law as providing an ‘additional factor’ to argue that 
the subpoena was ‘oppressive and an abuse of process’ (Pennells, para 45). 
WAN’s application succeeded in part ‘on the ground that the subpoena is 
oppressive and constitutes an abuse of process, having regard to the shield laws’ 
(Pennells, para 8). This was the first time such an outcome was achieved in 
reliance on shield law and it was the first test for the newly-enacted WA shield 
law. On 6 August 2013 the court ruled that the subpoena should be set aside, 
save to the extent that it sought the production of documents which already 
identified the sources (Pennells, paras 126 and 232). In this case, while some 
of the documents sought were received on condition of source anonymity, 
some were not. WAN relied on other grounds to defeat the subpoena but those 
grounds were rejected (Pennells, para 46). The court also rejected WAN’s argu-
ments on the Newspaper Rule for the same reasons seen above. In the result, 
it was enough for the court to rely on the WA shield law to excuse WAN from 
disclosure, without having to consider other grounds that WAN relied on. As 
Justice Janine Pritchard said plainly:
[I]n my view the operation of the Shield Laws is a factor sufficient of 
itself to warrant the conclusion that the subpoena is oppressive and an 
abuse of process. (Pennells, para 85, emphasis added) 
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The court overcame the ‘timing’ issue by finding that the shield law pro-
tection applied in relation to undertakings given before the commencement 
of the shield law provisions, if the proceedings concerned had not yet begun 
and in this case the ‘substantive hearing of the arbitration’ had not yet begun 
(Pennells, paras 128 and 132). As to why would it be oppressive and an abuse 
of process to require disclosure, the court accepted that it was ‘very unlikely’ 
or ‘highly unlikely’ that disclosure would be required during arbitration tak-
ing into account the WA shield law found in ss. 20I and 20J of the Evidence 
Act of Western Australia (Pennells, paras 142 and 167). To require disclosure 
‘would wholly undermine the protection’ under the shield law, set out in s. 20I 
(Pennells, para 168). That section establishes a presumption that a journalist 
or the employer cannot be compelled to give identifying evidence. While it 
was only a presumption rather than an entitlement it was sufficient in this case 
to provide the shield protection sought. 
Lessons from the cases 
While an overarching principle that will provide journalists the key to the 
protection that they seek for confidential sources would go a long way to 
the formulation of a clear and forceful rule providing ‘effective’ protection, 
such a principle will prove elusive as long as the goal is not absolute protec-
tion, such as is available in some United States jurisdictions. One such US 
provision is s. 12-21-142 of the Alabama Code (Middleton & Lee, 2013, 
pp. 547-548). The recognition of the desirability of journalist confidential 
source protection beyond the journalism community, embracing legislators 
and the courts, provides a good foundation to build upon. Against the above 
backdrop, and further to the ‘lessons’ already identified above, two further 
observations may be made. 
The Newspaper Rule
This rule has been described as being ‘shrouded in uncertainty’ (Cojuangco, 
pp. 351-352) and the above cases reinforce the courts’ position that this rule 
is not a rule at all but simply a practice to guide the exercise of the court’s 
discretion whether to require disclosure (Pennells, para 75; Liu, 2012, paras 
14 and 44; Liu, 2013, para 91). The courts have acknowledged that important 
public information is more readily supplied to journalists when journalists 
are able to honour their promises of confidentiality. A long line of authority, 
however, shows that the rule does not confer on journalists any immunity 
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from disclosure because of the overriding public interest in the administra-
tion of justice which demands that courts must not forfeit their duty and right 
to access relevant and admissible evidence. Furthermore, the High Court 
sees no prospect of success in trying to give the rule constitutional force in 
respect of communications that fall within the implied freedom of politi-
cal communication (Liu, HCA). While this demonstrates that the Newspaper 
Rule itself stands no chance of fully serving the object of a journalist source 
privilege it may be invoked in limited circumstances to protect journalists’ 
sources. It also reinforces the view, more recently expressed by Professor 
Gelber, that the implied freedom of political communication, which was ini-
tially hailed as a free speech saviour, ‘is possibly weaker in its operation now 
than at any time since its introduction in 1992’ (Gelber, 2013, p. 7). Some 
two decades on there is little progress in identifying what counts as political 
communication (Campbell & Crilly, 2011, p. 60).
Scope of shield law 
The first point about the scope of protection would be to ensure that all juris-
dictions are served by shield law. As noted earlier, three jurisdictions do not 
have statutory protection for journalists’ confidential sources. Where such 
law is available, the provisions in place vary, for example, in relation to 
who may claim protection and in the course of what activity. In the New 
South Wales Act the meaning of ‘journalist’ appears narrower than that of the 
Commonwealth Act (ss. 126J; and 126G(1), respectively; Butler & Rodrick, 
2012, p. 445). The argument for a wide or narrow definition is not clear-cut. 
Among the causes of this uncertainty are the worldwide digital revolution, 
the state of flux in the journalism profession; and the parameters of profes-
sionalism for a claim to privilege. While the media industry, in particular, 
favours a broad definition that encompasses mainstream and non-mainstream 
media and traditional and non-traditional forms of journalistic activity such 
a position inevitably broadens the field of potential protection claimants and 
potential circumstances in which the protection is sought. 
It should be hardly surprising that the wider the range of evidence that 
is sought to be withheld from the court ‘the more reluctant will judges be to 
exercise discretion in favour of doing so’ (Brandis, 2011). A further consi- 
deration is the range of forums, judicial and otherwise, to which claims for 
protection would apply. In Western Australia, for example, the privilege 
applies to any proceeding even if the law of that proceeding says the shield 
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does not apply (s. 20H(3)). The Act expressly provides, however, that the statu-
tory protection does not apply directly to a proceeding before either House of 
Parliament or a Committee of either House in which evidence may be given. 
For the protection to be effective in the media’s eyes, it should cover all forums 
in which journalists might face a demand for disclosure, extending beyond the 
courts to cover, for example, parliamentary proceedings, royal commissions, 
corruption and crime commissions and other commissions of inquiry where 
evidence may be taken. 
A similar observation can be made in respect of the applicability of 
shield law protection to particular legal mechanisms that may be deployed to 
discover confidential sources. One such mechanism arose for consideration 
in the Pennells case where the disclosure was sought under a subpoena. The 
court in that case found it ‘curious’ that the Western Australia parliament did 
not include in the Evidence Act a provision like s. 131A, Evidence Act 1995 
(NSW), which expressly allows for an objection to the production of documents 
under subpoena. As the court said, such an omission could mean that ‘the very 
protections the Shield Laws are designed to provide could be significantly 
undermined, if not rendered nugatory’ (Pennells, para 104). The NSW provision 
provides a list of situations in which objections may be made to disclosure 
covering not only a subpoena, but also to a number of other situations and 
this should form a basis for preventing such a lapse in a uniform shield law. 
Law reform in this area should provide for the variety of such situations and 
put the reach of shield law beyond doubt. 
Another apparent bugbear in framing the scope of the shield law has 
been the long list of factors that a court may take into account in exercising 
its discretion to order disclosure. The length of the list may have unjustifiably 
undermined the media’s confidence in the utility of the WA shield law because 
it gave the appearance of difficult hurdles in the media’s path. As it turned 
out in the Pennells case, however, they were surmountable hurdles. The list 
of factors set out in s. 20J include any likely adverse effect of the disclosure 
on the informant’s or another’s identity; and the public interest in the news 
media’s communications of facts and opinions and access to sources of facts. 
This is accompanied by a non-exhaustive list of factors in s. 20J(3), includ-
ing the probative value of the evidence; the nature and gravity of the relevant 
offence; cause of action or defence; and the likely effect of the identifying 
evidence, including the harm that could be caused to the informant or others. The 
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listing of these factors, rather than actively constraining the shield law’s reach, 
provides clarity as to the factors that could play a role in the court’s decision 
and should serve as a guide to the media when contemplating confidentiality 
undertakings. The Western Australia shield law—largely the handiwork of 
former Western Australia Attorney-General Christian Porter—has been des- 
cribed as ‘one of the most intelligent attempts so far—not only in Australia, 
but also worldwide’ (Brown, 2011).
Caution on uniformity
The ideal of uniform shield law has been repeatedly stated (Philip Ruddock, 
Second Reading Speech, 2007; Warren, 2013, p. 4). This, however, does not 
mean there is unanimity as to the need to statutorily enshrine source protec-
tion or as to the content of the shield. While there are strong justifications 
for seeking uniform rules governing journalist-source confidentiality—the 
attainment of clarity and certainty being among them—such uniformity must 
not be pursued at the expense of effective source protection. Arriving at the 
present point where the majority of jurisdictions have enacted protection of 
one form or another has taken considerable time and effort, and the ‘conver-
sion’ of shield law doubters. Important shield law reform work lies ahead 
to ensure that all concerned can proceed with certainty that where iniquity, 
injustice and impropriety fester journalists can continue to perform their vital 
role in exposing it, safe in the knowledge that they can invoke a core ethical 
principle of journalism—to respect confidences. 
Conclusion 
A media industry coalition, Australia’s Right to Know, which commissioned 
a free speech audit noted:
There is a good case for an effective shield law regime based on a pre-
sumption that sources should not be revealed and a journalist could only 
be ordered to do so by a judge on strictly limited grounds of compelling 
public interest. (Moss, 2007, p. 73) 
It reinforces the established common understanding on all sides of the debate 
that the shield envisaged is a qualified one. In the absence of absolute protec-
tion, the protection offered to journalists’ confidential sources could only be 
one that balances the competing interests (Cojuangco, pp. 354-5; McKen-
zie, 2013b, paras 3-4; Pennells, para 151; Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 20J). 
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A failure to acknowledge this rationale will give rise to unilateral claims for 
protection (Liu, 2012, para 204). It would be too much to expect courts and 
other bodies exercising judicial functions to forfeit their power to compel 
disclosure at the expense of their ability to do justice between the parties. 
Once this limit on source protection is conceded, what remains to be done is 
to ensure that the circumstances in which disclosure is compelled adequately 
heed the interests of the free flow of information and the important public 
interest served by the investigatory work that journalists do. 
The arguments supporting the broad case for protection of journalists’ 
confidential sources can be taken as settled—to the point of being deemed as 
‘common sense’ (Liu, 2010, para 51). The media is also entitled to expect that 
once the threshold is crossed as to whether journalists’ sources deserve pro-
tection, and once that crossed threshold is reflected in statute as a journalists’ 
privilege, there must be no questioning of the existence of such a privilege, 
as has happened on some occasions (Fernandez, 2013a, p. 20). Journalists 
for their part must be prepared to forego protection where the reasonableness 
of their claim for protection is open to serious question. Reliance on tainted 
information—for example, reliance on information provided by sources with 
malafides or reliance on forged documents—or a failure to properly consider 
the withdrawal of consent to use certain information, could undermine the 
claim for protection. The journalist’s dilemma faced in this respect can, to 
some extent, be avoided by making a promise of confidentiality conditional 
upon the journalist’s ability to revoke the promise in the case of deliberately 
false information (Liu, 2012, para 60).
Until effective protection of journalists’ confidential sources is attained, 
journalists will be under pressure to penetrate the fortresses that obstruct the 
flow of ‘public concern’ information and must ‘learn smarter ways of working 
to ensure we can protect our sources and their information’ (Warren, 2013, 
p. 4). Ewart et al note that ‘the post-9/11 counter-terror regime has already 
impacted upon journalists’ access to sources and court information, their 
information gathering and data storage protocols, and their relationship with 
sources, particularly those in counter-terror agencies’ (2013, p. 131). That 
journalists must on occasion resort to questionable methods of accessing 
information should come as no surprise. It is a reality fomented by consi- 
derable obstacles in the way of information flow and the overriding public 
interests journalists consider themselves to be serving. The Australian Law 
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Reform Commission, for instance, has identified 506 secrecy provisions in 
176 pieces of primary and subordinate legislation and about 70 percent of the 
statutory secrecy provisions identified creates criminal offences (Australian 
Law Reform Commission, 2009, paras 3.20-3.21). 
Shield law is part of the jigsaw in a complex information control frame-
work that incorporates legislation such as those governing secrecy, privacy, 
freedom of information and national security. The cases discussed above 
contribute modestly to an understanding of where to place the fulcrum on 
the scales weighing the competing interests. In the meanwhile, journalists 
must continue to evaluate the risks of relying on confidential sources. They 
face the choice of yielding to the chilling effect of weak source protec-
tion or placing themselves and their sources in harm’s way by relying on 
confidential sources or by engaging in questionable information gathering 
methods with its attendant risks of moral, ethical and legal compromises. 
Veteran investigative journalist Chris Masters notes how, ‘[w]hen processing 
unattributable intelligence we took care to code and organise key informa-
tion without identifying references such as phone numbers’ (Masters, 2013, 
p. 17). Pearson offers further caution: ‘Be extra careful if you are dealing in 
this area. Surveillance and monitoring is so prevalent and sophisticated today 
that it is very hard to keep any source confidential or secret’ (Pearson, 2012, 
p. 124). An excessive resort to questionable information gathering techniques, 
however, could undermine the journalism profession’s legitimacy in holding 
others to account. Excluding such measures from a journalist’s professional 
arsenal, however, also risks undermining the core function of journalism in 
a democratic society. As the European Court of Human Rights noted in the 
Goodwin case, ‘freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential founda-
tions of a democratic society and that the safeguards to be afforded to the press 
are of particular importance’ (para 39). At the heart of the matter lies another 
significant conundrum. A key argument advanced for a stronger shield is the 
facilitation it will bring to information flow. That very shield, however, rests 
on a claim to restrict the flow of information that the courts may need to rely 
on for the proper administration of justice.
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